This paper aims to shed light on the historiographical and archival component of an important topic -the efforts to build an independent Ukrainian state in the period 1917-1921. It also scrutinizes Polish Eastern Policy of that period to provide background for further research. The issues touched upon in this brief review indicate the need for further research in this thematic realm. The historiography given in this article captures the views of Polish political elites at the turn of the twentieth century. It could be argued that these elites were strongly focused on the resurrection of an independent Polish state.
"There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine." 1 The strategic goal of Józef Piłsudski was to resurrect the 18th-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with the long-term goal of dismantling the Russian Empire in any of its forms. Therefore he viewed the Intermarium Federation as a counterweight to Russian and German imperialism.2 In the aftermath of the Polish-Soviet War (1919 -1921 Piłsudski's concept of a federation of Central and Eastern European countries, based on a Polish-Ukrainian core, unfortunately did not bear fruits. This failure to create a strong counterweight to Germany and the Soviet Union doomed the potential member-countries of this project to the fate of victims of World War II.3 An endeavor to reanimate the idea of a "Central European Union" -a triangular geopolitical entity placed in between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic or Aegean Seas -was made during World War II by Władysław Sikorski's Polish Government in Exile. A declaration of the Polish Underground State from that period called for the creation of a Central European federal union, without the domination of any particular state.4
The idea survived until today and can be traced in regional-security cooperation. In light of the recent Ukrainian crisis the well-known international intelligence and security organization Stratfor has been discussing an alliance system recalling the Intermarium concept. Given the re-appearance of Russian power, the idea of the Intermarium seems to be coming back onto the international agenda.5
Much research has been done on the topic of the Ukrainian revolutionary period and Ukrainian People's Republic as a whole by John S. Reshetar, Jr. in his The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917 -1921 (Princeton, N.J., 1952 reprinted New York, 1972) as well as by Isidore Nahayewsky in the History of the Modern Ukrainian State, 1917 State, -1923 Alliance, 1919 -1921 (Edmonton, 1995 .
In an effort to achieve a more balanced appraisal of Józef Piłsudski's total political career Professor M. K. Dziewanowski, in Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918 -1922 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969 , has chosen to examine what he considers the "peak" of Piłsudski's career: the four-year period between the end of World War I and the Treaty of Riga while he was Head of State of the reborn Polish Republic, the Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces, and the architect of Poland's eastern policy. M. K. Dziewanowski has subjected to scrutiny Marshal Piłsudski's political, diplomatic, and military strategies, which, had they succeeded, would have created a Polish-led federation of East-European borderland states to serve as a permanent buffer against German and Russian historic expansionism. Piłsudski's vision of federal association -to a degree similar to the Jagiellonian Commonwealth of the seventeenth century -could have been a resemblance of the "Polish-Lithuanian Union" as large as a PolishLithuanian-Belorussian-Ukranian Federation stretching from the Oder to the Dnieper, yet might also have been extended to include Latvia, Estonia, and Finland in a bigger Baltic Confederation.
M. K. Dziewanowski has thoroughly mastered the secondary literature on the subject and utilizes the vast amount of published documents pertaining to borderland diplomacy. The originality of the study lies in the author's disclosure of unpublished archival material from the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York, the National Archives in Washington, the Hoover Institute in Stanford, and the Symon Petliura archives in Paris. The author has made use of oral testimony from Józef Piłsudski's contemporaries who were able to shed additional light on the marshal's federalist scheme. Józef Piłsudski seldom used the term "federalism" and never expounded his ideas in a systematic way. Józef Piłsudski, according to M. K. Dziewanowski, is said to have had a strong dislike for ideology, consequently "his federalism was not theoretical: it was more instinctive and pragmatic, derived as it was from a traditional respect for the diversity that had surrounded him from his earliest days." 6 M. K. Dziewanowski argues that Piłsudski's virtue lay in the fact that he was a realist and a pragmatist. This kind of thinking inter alia brought Poland to a prosperous stance within the future project of the European Union that was to emerge after WWII.
In order to make a contribution to the conventional understanding of the emergence of new states following the break-up of empires one needs to examine closely Ukrainian-Polish relations from the end of the Great War until the ultimate failure of Ukrainian endeavors to create an independent Ukrainian state in 1921. The ideas put forward during this period for a federal union of states could be viewed as a prototype of the EU project that took root after WWII.
The situation in which Ukraine was placed in between the "first Soviets" aggression and a Polish state being not entirely interested in a strong independent Ukraine was very much ambivalent. The foundation of this research shall be based on the cooperation between Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura -what were the preconditions for it before the Treaty concluded by the UNR and Poland in Warsaw on April 24, 1920, which meant also recognition of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic by Poland. The Ukrainian army in alliance with the Polish went to war against Bolshevik Russia in order to restore the Ukrainian Directory in Ukraine. Yet, Poland failed to stick up to the Treaty provisions, abandoning the UNR to Bolshevik Russia and under the Endek's pressure signing a cease-fire on March 18, 1921, at the Treaty of Riga with the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian SSR. The Treaty of Riga provided that the Ukrainian lands were divided between Poland and Russia, and that the Poles recognized Soviet Ukraine as an independent state. In the aftermath Poland retained the Kholm/Chełm region with Pidliashia, Polissia and Western Volhynia in addition to Galicia (Eastern Galicia was annexed by Poland on March 15, 1923, following the decision of the Council of Ambassadors). UNR troops were afterward interned in Poland. However, much more interesting is to see what further happened to the interned UNR troops in Szczypiorno: how did the life of the 700 strong Ukrainian community look like, what was the role of the church that was functioning there?
The major part of the Petliura regime archival materials were stored in Tarnów (Poland), where the UNR had purchased a building that served as one of its operation centers during its active participation as a Polish ally in the military operations against the new Bolshevik regime. These included the records of the UNR Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Finance. Some of the Ukrainian emigrants had stayed on in Tarnów during the interwar period, and the city even had a Ukrainian history museum. During the wartime occupation of Poland Nazi authorities discovered a significant body of UNR records in Tarnów, that were most probably held in the same building where the museum was located. Part of the archive reportedly had been purchased by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, and accordingly, the Nazi archival administration initially planned to transfer it to Lviv to be consolidated with the Sheptytsky archive there, as is evidenced in an early report in 1941.7
It was subsequently transferred from Tarnów to Kraków. Heinz Goring, Third Reich archivist, who served as a head of the State Archive in Kaliningrad (Königsberg), during the war took charge of the State Archive in Kraków, and he personally supervised the transportation of Petliura's UNR materials to Kraków in March 1942.8 Those materials in Kraków were deemed of such high priority that even during wartime individuals were made responsible for carefully processing and archiving them. Włodzimierz Budka, a Polish archival director who was involved in the Nazi archival service in Kraków during the war, was put in charge of the arrangement and description of the UNR materials from Tarnów.
In the time between November 1942 and late February 1943 he arranged three groups of materials, among which were archival documents, bank notes, and publications. By July 1943, with the assistance of a Ukrainian expert from Lviv, Volodymyr Matsiak, he arranged the Foreign Ministry files and prepared an inventory covering 258 files and bound volumes.9 These portions of the UNR Foreign Ministry records were evacuated to the Wieliczka salt mine in January 1944, along with other Kraków archives.10
However, not all of the UNR records found in Tarnow (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) . Kraków: Arcana, 2004. 
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